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Abstract 
 
The Effect of Globalization on Voter Turnout 
 
Dragana Djukic, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Robert Moser 
 
Despite significant efforts to understand the recent decline of voter turnout in democratic 
societies, the empirical explanations behind this development as well as regarding the 
overall cross-national variation in turnout rates remain rather limited. I contribute to this 
discourse by examining the effects of globalization on electoral turnout.  More 
specifically, I seek to amend the argument raised by Hellwig who claims that economic 
globalization dissuades voters from voting on the matters related to economic policy and, 
at the same time, encourages them to put more weight on non-economic issue 
evaluations. I strive towards the modification of this argument by broadening the concept 
of globalization to include not only its economic aspects, such as trade and financial 
investments, but rather the overall spectrum of international effects on domestic policy 
provision, including the matters of politics, society and markets. Contrary to Hellwig, I 
posit a negative relationship between globalization and turnout in general and I test my 
hypothesis on an aggregate-level dataset covering parliamentary elections in 25 OECD 
democracies from 1970 to 2006. The empirical results show that only economic 
globalization exhibits a consistently significant effect on voter turnout while the influence 
of political and social types of international forces are found to be statistically 
inconsequential. While I find no empirical support for my argument, my analysis 
uncovers more comprehensively the mechanism of how economic globalization 
decreases turnout by looking at international pressures across a variety of issue areas, 
both economic and non-economic ones, thus comparing their individual effects. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Despite significant efforts to understand the recent decline of voter turnout in 
democratic societies1, the empirical explanations behind this development as well as 
regarding the overall cross-national variation in turnout rates remain rather limited.  In this 
paper, I contribute to this discourse by examining the effects of globalization on electoral 
turnout.  More specifically, I seek to amend the argument raised by Hellwig who claims that 
economic globalization dissuades voters from voting on the matters related to economic 
policy and, at the same time, encourages them to put more weight on non-economic issue 
evaluations.  Namely, Hellwig argues that voters perceive domestic policy makers to be 
constrained by the global economy in the areas of economic policy-making but not in other 
areas such as the environment and minority rights, which is why electoral civic engagement 
decreases in the former and increases in the latter.2  I strive towards the modification of this 
argument by broadening the concept of globalization to include not only its economic 
aspects, such as trade and financial investments, but rather the overall spectrum of 
international effects on domestic policy provision, including the matters of politics, society 
and markets.  The more the public perceives its country’s domestic politics to be exposed to 
global influences, the less it will be motivated to voice its choice at the polls.  Contrary to 
Hellwig, I therefore posit a negative relationship between globalization and turnout in 
general and I test my hypothesis on an aggregate-level dataset covering parliamentary 
elections in 25 OECD democracies from 1970 to 2006. 
                                                 
1
 Franklin, 2004 
2
 Hellwig, 2008, pp. 1128-1130 
 2 
Examining the consequences of globalization on mass political behavior and attitude 
is important for understanding the benefit of voting.  If globalization diminishes the capacity 
of national policy makers to influence relevant outcomes, voters may be prompted to 
conclude that the benefits of voting are too low to compensate for the costs of turning up at 
the polls, which may have long-term detrimental consequences for the institution of 
elections. More specifically, my study advances scholarship on globalization and its effects 
on turnout on the theoretical grounds by re-conceptualizing it to include the effects of global 
influences beyond market integration.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I first review the recent work on 
the consequences of economic globalization on policy-making and voting turnout, arguing 
that such an approach is insufficient and in need of theoretical advancements.  I then present 
my theoretical model. The subsequent two sections describe the data and variables used, and 
the results of the empirical analysis. The final section concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Review of the Existing Literature 
 
In a broader spectrum of things, the discussion about the influence of globalization on 
voting behavior has developed within the previously existing debate on whether the 
integration of national markets for capital and labor affects policy outcomes.  The debate has 
led to the establishment of two broad perspectives: convergence and divergence schools of 
thought. Proponents of the convergence argument contend that in today’s highly integrated 
world, states must compete to attract capital, which often implies the introduction of such 
uniform strategies as cuts in spending, lower taxes for international investors and a general 
weakening of the state’s redistributive capacity.3  This perspective predicts a pessimistic race 
to the bottom in rates on mobile capital and welfare provisions. For example, Hays argues 
that while we are likely never to observe “bottom” capital tax rates since they do not 
converge to zero, he does demonstrate that the capital tax rates would have been higher if 
there was no tax competition for foreign investment among national governments.4  On the 
other hand, the supporters of the divergence point of view argue that economic integration 
results in public economic uncertainty, thus leading to political demands for more social 
protection.  This perspective predicts that economic globalization will actually result in more, 
not less, welfare provisions.5  For example, Garrett even goes so far as to assert that there is a 
“virtuous circle between activist government and international openness,” implying that 
                                                 
3
 Hellwig and Samuels, 2007, p. 285; see also Mosley, 2000, p. 738-741 
4
 Hays, 2003, p. 95-110 
5
 Hellwig and Samules, 2007, p. 285-286; see also Mosley, 2000, p. 738-741 
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despite economic integration, such long-standing forces as history and institutions enable 
state leaders to preserve significant independence in domestic policy-making.6 
The literature on economic integration and national policies cannot explain how 
globalization affects voter perceptions of policy responsiveness and, in turn, vote outcomes.  
For this we should look within the discourse of economic voting.  This type of voting 
behavior implies that citizens decide on whom to vote for based on economic outcomes or, 
more specifically, their perceptions of economic outcomes.7  Utilizing the logic of economic 
voting, Hellwig argues that voters who perceive their political leaders to be highly 
constrained by economic globalization will expect less policy responsiveness in the areas of 
economic decision-making when deciding on whom to give their vote.  At the same time, and 
as a way of compensating for this deficiency in policy provision, the voters will place more 
weight on non-economic performance (e.g. in the areas of the environmental, minority rights 
and cultural diversity policy-making).8  Similarly to Hellwig, Fernandez-Albertos examines 
the link between economic openness and economic voting, arguing that the more open a 
country is the less pronounced economic voting will be among the electorate.  Put differently, 
this author argues that sophisticated voters tend to be more forgiving towards their 
incumbents’ poor economic performance in situations of high international exposure.9   
Unlike Hellwig and Fernandez-Albertos whose research focuses on addressing the 
question of whom voters will support at the polls, Steiner examines the effects of economic 
globalization on voters’ decision of whether or not to show up at the polls at all.  Much like 
                                                 
6
 Garrett, 1998, p. 789, cited in Hellwig and Samuels, 2007, p. 286-287 
7
 Duch and Stevenson, 2008, p. 16-17 
8
 Hellwig, 2008, p. 1128 
9
 Fernández-Albertos, Jose, 2006, p. 30-33 
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this paper, the same author argues that voters are less inclined to vote in more open 
economies.  Conceptually speaking, however, Steiner’s point of departure is still similar to 
that of the previous two authors because they all focus exclusively on economic 
globalization.   
While it can be argued that Steiner’s line of reasoning is more parsimonies than mine 
since it predicts the same outcome with a more narrowly defined independent variable, I 
believe that my study has the potential to uncover more fully the mechanism of how 
globalization decreases turnout due to my focus on the broader effects of global influences.  
Additionally, Steiner does not address the argument of compensation theorized by Hellwig.  
Instead, he simply reorients his attention to an alternative dependent variable (that of whether 
to vote or not rather than whom to vote for, as Hellwig does), failing to address the point as 
to why voters do not expect more state policy responsiveness in non-economic matters before 
they decide not to show up at the polls.  For Steiner’s argument to hold, it has to be assumed 
that policy convergence and thus a decrease in policy provision does not occur in other (i.e. 
non-economic) areas of interest.  As this paper will show, this assumption is unlikely since 
globalization does not only affect economy but also other spheres of domestic policy-
making.  I fill up this gap in Steiner’s reasoning by re-defining the concept of globalization to 
include a broader spectrum of international effects on domestic policy provision, and in 
doing so answer why the compensatory argument is unrealistic.  
 
 
 
 
 6 
Theoretical Argument  
 
 
The Concept of Globalization 
 
Before laying out the theoretical framework, it is important to explain the meaning of 
globalization as comprehended for the purposes of this paper.  Since I diverge from the 
conventional understanding of this term, namely that of strictly economic exchange-led 
integration, in order to capture more constructively the causal mechanism driving the 
dynamic forces of globalization – I find it necessary to define this concept in more detail.  
Broadly speaking, globalization is understood as a process that erodes national sovereignty 
through a variety of forces including regulations, people, capital, information and ideas.10  
This definition is embedded in the above mentioned convergence school of thought.  More 
specifically, the process of globalization consists of three distinct developments, which I refer 
to as political and legal obligations, competitive pressures and transnational 
communication.11   
The political and legal obligations mechanism occurs whenever an external political 
actor, often an international or a supranational institution, imposes certain policy changes 
over a domestic government.  An example would be the spread of Western monetary policies 
to Third World countries by the means of conditionalities in exchange for loans given by the 
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.12  The process, however, does not have to 
be coercive in nature.  Sometimes a policy imposed on a country by an international 
institution may be in the interest of the national government in a way that it may enable it to 
                                                 
10
 Norris, 2000, p. 155 
11
 Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 783 
12
 Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 347-348 
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introduce a policy that is not favored by its citizens.13  For example, when the OECD and the 
Council of Europe initially developed international agreements whose purpose was to 
regulate and protect transnational flow of data, the elite policy communities in Britain were 
generally in support of this idea while the wider public opposed it.  What ultimately enabled 
the British technocrats to bring their domestic law into conformity was the international 
treaty which they used to convince the wider society that not complying meant risking being 
excluded from the “club” and the overall benefits of harmonization.14  The political and legal 
treaties can therefore be both coercive and voluntary in character. 
The mechanism pertaining to competitive pressures presupposes economic integration 
among countries.  The international mobility of capital and workers imposes pressure on 
domestic governments to restructure their market regulations in order to avoid falling behind 
their neighboring countries that have already implemented such reforms.15  The pressure 
often arises from threats of foreign investors to shift their activities elsewhere if, for example, 
the costs of production are not harmonized with lower-cost countries.16  This induces 
governments to lower their regulatory standards and other barriers that can be detrimental to 
economic exchange.  What is implied is that national governments out of the desire to 
become more regionally or internationally competitive transfer some of their power from the 
state to global private actors.  
                                                 
13
 Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 781 
14
 Bennett, 1991, p. 228 
15
 Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 782 
16
 Hoberg, 2001, p. 127 
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With respect to transnational communication, this mechanism presupposes 
information exchange and communication with other countries.17  In this case, the medium of 
international influence is ideas.  New ideas are generally adopted as a means to solve policy 
problems and this entails the process of lesson-drawing.  Consistent with the concept of 
Bayesian learning, governments are likely to follow the lead of those countries whose 
policies have proven successful.18  The exchange of information and ideas is improved if 
countries’ state officials are able to socialize at frequent meetings.  In fact, some international 
institutions such as the OECD have been established in part to facilitate the exchange of 
ideas.19  This has been partially demonstrated by the above example of the OECD and the 
Council of Europe under the political and legal obligations mechanism.  Furthermore, ideas 
can also be transmitted via communication networks consisting of private actors.  For 
example, business owners may share ideas about appropriate economic practices by 
referencing the experiences of the countries with which they have important trading 
contacts.20 
What all of the above mechanisms have in common is that they erode national 
boundaries, which in one way or another, diminishes the capacity of domestic governments 
to control policy outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 782-783 
18
 Simmons and Elkins, 2004, p. 175 
19
 Bennett, 1991, p. 220-223 
20
 Simmons and Elkins, 2004, p. 175 
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Theoretical Setup 
 
My theoretical argument builds on the above-stated notion that globalization reduces 
the ability of national governments to influence policy results.  This is also a core idea of the 
literature on economic globalization.  The detrimental consequences of globalization as 
understood in this paper on domestic policy-making should be even stronger considering its 
multifaceted nature and thus effects.  Instead of focusing on the impact of economic 
integration on domestic policy provision, I take into consideration a more comprehensive set 
of international influences, including the political/legal and idea-driven pressures, in addition 
to standard economic forces.  As illustrated in the first half of this section, I find this 
definition of globalization to be more convincing and empirically relevant.  This 
reconceptualization then enables me to focus on the question that Hellwig and the rest of the 
supporters of the economic voting model seemingly neglect, namely whether voters will find 
it useful to vote at all.  This question theoretically precedes the focus on the analysis of how 
voting decisions are made.  Before examining the question of whom voters will vote for, we 
need to ask whether they will want to vote at all.  By delineating the consequences of 
globalization to include only economic effects, Hellwig is able to make an argument about 
compensation between economic and non-economic issues.  The possibility of compensation 
disappears if we extend the meaning of globalization to include other non-economic areas of 
regulatory decision-making, a shift that this paper finds empirically necessary, as suggested 
above.  Therefore, much like Hellwig, I make an assumption that individuals are aware of the 
fact that their national policy makers’ decisions are influenced by global forces.  However, in 
this paper, awareness encompasses both economic and non-economic spheres of policy-
 10 
making.  Under such conditions, I examine the effects of globalization on voter turnout and I 
resort to the classical rational choice model to represent it formally: 
 = ( − 	) + 		 − 	21 
 
 
In this model, an individual i will vote if his/her utility from voting Ri is greater than 
zero. The voter’s utility is calculated based on the probability Pi that his/her vote will make a 
difference, the difference between the desired (Bdi) and non-desired election outcome (Bndi), 
and a term Di which stands for intrinsic benefits of voting.22  The last term Ci represents the 
cost of voting. 
The manner in which globalization affects this equation is primarily through a 
decrease in the value of term Bdi – Bndi.  In globalized societies where national 
governments’ ability to deliver policies is weakened, the Bndi term is likely to be higher than 
in non-globalized countries where governments have more freedom to deliberate on matters 
of domestic politics.  This is because the national leaders of highly globalized countries have 
to follow a set of policies dictated by international forces, even if such decisions may 
contradict domestic interests.  Thus, regardless of the voter’s preferred party’s desire to 
deliver on his/her preferences, the party’s intentions will be hampered by the international 
pressures.  Informed individuals are cognizant of this development, and as such turn 
                                                 
21
 Steiner (2010, p. 447) applies a similar model in his article with respect to the effects of economic 
globalization on voter turnout; however, he fails to provide a convincing argument as to how economic 
globalization affects the voters’ perceptions vis-à-vis non-economic spheres of life. 
22
 Muller and Opp (1986, p. 474) provide multiple possibilities to think of this term and find two of them 
significant, namely the social reward of experiencing solidarity and the reword of behaving in accordance with 
a sense of citizen duty. 
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indifferent with regard to the election outcome.  The sense of indifference makes them less 
likely to vote.  From this I deduce my hypothesis: 
 
H: The more globalized a country is, the lower the turnout rates at national elections will be. 
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Research Design 
 
To test my hypothesis, I use an OLS analysis with the cross sectional/time-series data 
from parliamentary elections in 25 OECD countries23 in the period from 1970 to 2006.  I 
focus on developed democracies because the previous research on which I build has also 
concentrated on this group of countries, which is helpful for comparative purposes.  
Additionally, relying on a relatively homogenous sample of countries enables me to keep the 
many contextual factors constant, which further strengthens a pooling assumption I implicitly 
make throughout my paper.  Finally, an advantage of this sample is also the solid availability 
of data.   
Due to the nature of my sample, namely the diverging trend of voter turnout and 
globalization over the same period of time, I include time fixed effects in the form of 
dummies for every five-year period.  This technique provides an assurance that the observed 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables is causal in character rather 
than merely spurious. 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
I operationalize my dependent variable, voter turnout, as the ratio of votes cast to 
voting age population (VAP).  I also considered an alternative measure, the ratio of votes cast 
to the number of officially registered eligible voters, but decided against it because of the 
                                                 
23
 In alphabetical order, these include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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potential problems with endogeneity in those cases where voting is voluntary.24  I obtain the 
data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).25  I 
concentrate on parliamentary elections in 25 OECD countries, and within this sample I 
specifically examine only the elections to the unicameral legislature and in the event of a 
bicameral arrangement, only those to the lower house of the legislature. 
 
 
Independent Variable 
 
As previously stated, I define my independent variable, globalization, as a process 
that impinges on national sovereignty through a variety of flows including regulations, 
people, capital, information and ideas.26  I operationalize it as a composite index from the 
KOF27 Index of Globalization.28  This measure is produced by the KOF Swiss Economic 
Institute hosted at the ETH Zurich University29 and it combines three dimensions of 
globalization: political, economic and social.  Such a multifaceted measure captures well my 
conceptualization of this variable.  
The political dimension of globalization is measured according to the number of 
foreign embassies in a given country, international organizations which the country has 
joined, UN peace missions in which the country was involved and bilateral and multilateral 
                                                 
24
 Steiner, 2010, p. 449 
25
 I utilize the dataset created by Steiner who collected the data from International IDEA: Voter turnout 
(available online at: http://www.idea.int/vt/) 
26
 Norris, 2000, p. 155 
27
 KOF is an acronym for the German word “Konjunkturforschungsstelle”, which means “business cycle 
research institute” 
28
 Dreher et al, 2008 
29
 www.globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
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agreements the country has concluded since 1945.30  I find this variable to be suitable for 
depicting the political and legal obligations component of the globalization process.  Based 
on my definition of globalization, it might be more appropriate to focus only on two of the 
four elements constituting this measure, namely the number of memberships in international 
organizations and the number of international treaties a country has signed.  However, no 
separate data is available for these two factors and I am constrained to using the measure 
incorporating all of the proxies instead.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to speculate that 
an increase in all four of the elements (i.e. number of embassies, international organization 
memberships, UN peace missions, and international treaties) is likely to have a negative 
effect on voter turnout.     
The economic dimension of globalization measures cross-border trade, FDI/portfolio 
investments and income flows in relation to GDP, as well as the impact of restrictions on 
trade and capital movement.31  This measure encompasses well the process behind the 
competitive pressures mechanism described above.  The measures of openness (i.e. trade, 
investments and income flows) assess the international mobility of a given country’s capital 
and workers, while the measures of restrictions appraise the impact of a country’s import 
tariff and tax rates.  The distinction between these two measures is significant and produces 
                                                 
30
 According to the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, these data are taken from the Europa World Yearbook 
(various years), the CIA World Factbook (various years), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and 
the United Nations Treaties Collection. See KOF Index of Globalization, Method of Calculation, available 
online at: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/method_2015.pdf; see also the 
Variables and Weights document, available online at: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/variables_2015.pdf 
31
 KOF Swiss Economic Institute, KOF Index of Globalization, Method of Calculation, available online at: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/method_2015.pdf; see also the Variables and 
Weights document, available online at: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/variables_2015.pdf 
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more realistic results.  For example, a country can place high vis-à-vis its status of openness 
(this is typical for small, economically open and export-oriented countries), but it can place 
much lower with respect to the impact of its tariff restrictions.  This is the case of 
Switzerland, which places high on openness and significantly lower on the scale denoting the 
consequences of its import tariff duties.32  The combination of both of these measures 
produces a more realistic final measure.  This is particularly relevant to how this paper 
defines the mechanism of competitive pressures. Focusing exclusively on the measures of 
openness (as is often the case) to gauge economic integration would not be applicable for my 
conceptualization of this component of globalization because such a calculation would not 
take directly into consideration the effect of international pressures for regulatory reforms.  It 
is the restrictions side of the measure that captures this process.  Thus, the more tariffs a 
country has, the more resilient it is to international demands for policy reform and 
harmonization.  The impact of restrictions will be reduced the more economically open a 
country is.  Taking only one of these measures into account would be inappropriate because 
economic globalization is after all a combination of exports and imports and while these two 
measures do not always coincide (as shown above), they are significantly related to each 
other.  In conclusion, the greater the overall measure, the more likely we are to observe a 
decrease in voter turnout.       
The social dimension of globalization consists of three different categories.  The first 
comprises personal cross-border contacts such as telephone calls, letters, tourism flows and 
the size of the foreign population.  The second category includes cross-border flows of 
                                                 
32
 KOF Swiss Economic Institute, KOF Index of Globalization 2014, Press Release,  available online at: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2014/04/16/press_release_2014_en.pdf 
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information, which are measured in terms of access to the Internet, TV and foreign press 
products.  The last category assesses cultural proximity to the global mainstream by looking 
at a given country’s number of McDonald’s restaurants and Ikea branches as well as book 
exports and imports in relation to GDP.33  I use this measure to quantify the transnational 
communication mechanism.  As in the case of political globalization, I find some elements of 
this measure to be more related to my conceptualization of this dimension of globalization 
than others.  For example, I believe that the assessments of information flow and cultural 
proximity capture more convincingly the notion of lesson-drawing than the measure 
representing personal contacts.  The greater the usage of the Internet, the more likely the 
learning and emulation processes are to take place.  This is also the case with respect to TV 
and newspaper exposure as well as the experiences of visiting foreign-owned service-
oriented businesses.  These components seem particularly applicable as an assessment of the 
exchange of ideas between private actors.  On the other hand, the measures of personal 
contact do not appear as relevant for lesson-drawing.  This is because international telephone 
calls and letters are generally exchanged between same parties (i.e. family members) where 
learning of new ideas is less likely to occur.  Similarly, the link between international tourism 
and foreign population rates on the one hand and Bayesian learning on the other is weak at 
best because of infrequency and negligent idea exchange of such contacts. Unfortunately, no 
separate data is available for these three categories of social globalization, which is why I use 
all three of them.  An additional drawback of this variable is that it does not measure the 
                                                 
33
 KOF Swiss Economic Institute, KOF Index of Globalization, Method of Calculation, available online at: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/method_2015.pdf; see also the Variables and 
Weights document, available online at: 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2015/03/04/variables_2015.pdf 
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exchange of information among government officials, which is an important part of how the 
transnational communication mechanism is defined.  Despite these deficiences, the measure 
does appear appropriate to appraise the updating of information between private parties and 
as such relevant for operationalization purposes of the idea-exchange component of the 
globalization variable.  In sum, the higher the level of social globalization in a given country, 
the lower the expectations of electoral turnout. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
Numerous variables have been used to explain turnout.  In this paper, I focus on those 
that have been found significant by the scholarly community.  Among the variables related to 
the electoral system, I control for compulsory voting, legal voting age, voluntary registration 
and the number of years since the introduction of universal suffrage.  Compulsory voting is 
expected to increase voter turnout.34  Controlling for this variable is important since voting is 
mandatory in some countries in the sample and voluntary in others.  As for legal voting age, 
since (as the contemporary literature shows) the propensity to vote increases with age, an 
expectation is that turnout is likely to be lower when the voting age is 18 instead of 21.35  
Thus, this variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable.  With 
respect to voluntary registration, this variable is predicted to contribute to reduced turnout.36  
Finally, according to the proponents of the socialization school of thought who argue that 
                                                 
34
 Jackman, 1987, referenced in Blais, 2006, p. 112-113; also see Franklin, 2004 
35
 Blais, 2006, p. 115 
36
 Powell, 1982, referenced in Blais, 2006, p. 113 
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voting is a matter of habit, the number of years since the introduction of universal suffrage is 
expected to increase turnout.37 
In addition, I also include a standard set of socio-economic factors, namely GDP per 
capita (log), population size (log) and public spending as a percentage of GDP.   I obtain 
these variables from International IDEA, OECD, World Bank and ACE Electoral Knowledge 
Network.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Steiner, 2010, p. 451 
38
 Most of these variables were coded by Steiner and I use his dataset in my analysis. 
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Results 
 
I now test my hypotheses using the data and method described above.  My initial 
results show strong support for the composite index of globalization, as well as for every 
individual component of it.  However, once I have accounted for the presence of 
multicollinearity among the three components, only the economic globalization variable 
proves robust.  I re-confirm these results by running a factor analysis. 
As Table 1 shows, the globalization index variable is found to have a negative effect 
on voter turnout, as theorized.  The variable is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent 
level.  Several of the controls clearly show the expected effect.  As predicted, compulsory 
voting exhibits a strong positive effect on turnout rates.  Turnout is lower in elections where 
registration is voluntary.  In addition, turnout rises with the number of years since the 
introduction of universal suffrage which confirms political socialization arguments.  There is 
also evidence for the idea that population size will affect turnout negatively, a notion 
supported by those scholars who argue that small political environments with tighter 
community relations are more conducive to higher turnout than larger places with greater 
(and presumably more heterogeneous) population.39  Public spending, as expected, has a 
positive effect on turnout, confirming the reasoning that greater welfare spending (which 
implies increasing education levels and social capital) leads to higher turnout.40  GDP per 
capita shows a negative effect on the dependent variable.41  Finally, legal voting age does not 
                                                 
39
 Oliver, 2000, p. 363 
40
 Steiner, 2010, p. 450 
41
 The conventional literature is divided on the effects of this independent variable on voter turnout.  On the one 
hand there are those who argue that lower income tends to depress turnout in the industrial countries and 
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rise to statistical significance.  Overall, the model shows a good fit amounting to 71.1 percent 
of explained variance.  
 
 
                 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
increase it in the developing world (see Recliff, 1992, p. 446), and others who find that people in affluent areas 
participate less than people in heterogeneous, middle-income places (see Oliver, 2000, p. 362)   
 21 
Models 2-4 in Table 2 confirm the theorized independent effects of the three 
components of the composite index of globalization.  They are all found to be statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with the dependent variable.  All models exhibit a good 
fit with respect to the amount of variance explained.  
 
 
 
 
 Due to the composite nature of my dependent variable, which always poses a risk of 
multicollinearity problems, I check for correlation between the three components.   
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The Pearson correlation is moderately high (0.66) between the social and economic 
types of globalization, moderate (0.43) between the political and social categories, and low 
(0.17) between political and economic classes of globalization.  Overall, the results indicate 
some level of correlation that calls for further analysis.  I thus obtain residuals as exogenous 
measures of the three types of globalization.  I then use the residuals to re-estimate models 2-
4, which results in the decrease of coefficients for all three types of globalization.  
Noticeably, the coefficients for the political and social components of globalization even fail 
to reach standard levels of statistical significance.  Only the re-estimated economic 
globalization variable passes the significance test.  It alone explains 71.5 percent of the 
variance.  This leads me to believe that the results in Table 1 are primarily, if not entirely, 
driven by the effect of this variable.    
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To check the robustness of these findings, I run a factor analysis and obtain very 
similar results, as shown in Table 4: 
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 Taken together, these findings indicate that only economic globalization has 
substantial and consistent negative overall effect on electoral turnout, while the effects of 
political and social forms are questionable at best. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The paper has examined the effects of globalization – defined as political/legal 
obligations, competitive pressures and transnational communication – on electoral turnout.  
The composite index of globalization has been operationalized as the KOF index of 
globalization and the individual forms as political, economic and social types of international 
influence.  The OLS analysis shows that economic globalization exhibits a consistently 
significant effect on voter turnout, while the other two types of globalization have been 
shown to be largely inconsequential.  This is an important finding that provides additional 
evidence that economic voting does matter.  My paper uncovers more comprehensively the 
mechanism of how economic globalization decreases turnout by looking at international 
influences across a variety of issue areas, both economic and non-economic, and thus 
comparing their individual effects.  Finally, my results fill up the theoretical gap in Steiner’s 
reasoning by showing that economic factors indeed do take precedence over non-economic 
ones.   
It is important to note that my results may have been partly affected by how political 
and social types of globalization have been measured.  The potential drawbacks have been 
noted in the research design section under the independent variable subheading.  Obtaining 
individual-level data about these two variables may be helpful.  For example, political 
globalization can be measured by asking potential voters about how they think that 
globalization has affected their national government’s regulatory capabilities.  Similarly, 
social globalization can be assessed by inquiring directly about voters’ perceptions of the 
effects of globalization on their lifestyles and patterns of consumption. 
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Looking ahead, it seems reasonable to focus on the impact of economic forces of 
globalization.  If economic factors do take precedence over non-economic matters, as this 
paper and the conventional literature on the topic seem to indicate – then why do voters in 
globalized societies increase the salience on non-economic issues, as Hellwig argues, rather 
than ask for more, not less, policy provision in this very same area, as the proponents of the 
divergence school of thought would have it?  Perhaps the answer may be in the convergence 
of party platforms under the influence of international obligations, in which case voting itself 
becomes somewhat irrelevant.  The contradictory nature of these questions merits further 
investigation.    
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